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Abstract
The proliferation of cyber-attacks is accompanied by an urgent need to develop
sophisticated detection tools. Some of these tools are based on algorithms inspired
from the Human Immune System (HIS). The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is one
of such HIS inspired methods, which is based on the Danger theory model.
In this thesis, two types of DCA algorithm are identified, namely the deterministic and
classical DCA in order to improve the algorithm's applicability and performance to
detect TCP port scanning. This algorithm consists of components based on the
behavior of Human dendritic cell, which involves four categories of the input signals.
The ultimate goal of this research is to describe the DCA algorithm, implement both
types of DCA using Java language and test these implementations by data collected
from a real TCP port scan experiment. Three scenarios are conducted to perform this
experiment attack, normal and mix scenario. The results show that the DCA can be
applied to detect anomalous port scans. The research also compares the performance
of the two DCA in detecting the malicious process.
Keywords: Artificial immune systems, dendritic cell algorithm, denial of service,
intrusion detection, port scanning.
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)Title and Abstract (in Arabic

صنِيَّة للكشف عن مسح المنفذ الخبيث
منهج يعتمد على خوارزمية ال َخالَيا التَغَ ُّ
الملخص

يرافق انتشار الهجمات السيبرانية حاجة ملحة لتطوير أدوات كشف متطورة .تعتمد بعض
هذه األدوات على خوارزميات مستوحاة من نظام المناعة البشري ( .)HISتعد خوارزمية الخلية
صنيَّة ( )DCAإحدى الطرق المستوحاة من نظام  ، HISوالتي تعتمد على نموذج نظرية
التَغَ ُّ
الخطر .Danger
في هذه األطروحة  ،تم تحديد نوعين من خوارزمية  ، DCAوهما خوارزميات DCA
الحتمية والكالسيكية من أجل تحسين تطبيق الخوارزمية وأداؤها للكشف فحص منفذ  .TCPتتكون
هذه الخوارزمية من مكونات تعتمد على سلوك الخلية الشجيرية البشرية  ،التي تشتمل على أربع
فئات من إشارة الدخل.
الهدف النهائي من هذا البحث هو وصف خوارزمية  ، DCAوتنفيذ نوعين من DCA
باستخدام لغة الجافا واختبار هذا التنفيذ عن طريق البيانات التي تم جمعها من تجربة فحص منفذ
 .TCPيتم تنفيذ ثالثة سيناريوهات ألداء هذه التجربة تحديدًا سيناريوالهجوم والسيناريو العادي
صنيَّة للكشف عن فحص منفذ
والمختلط .تظهر النتائج أنه يمكن تطبيق خوارزمية الخاليا التَغَ ُّ
الخبيث .يقارن البحث أيضا ً بين أداء خوارزمتي  DCAفي الكشف عن العملية الخبيثة.
صنيَّة ،رفض الخدمة،
مفاهيم البحث الرئيسية :نظام المناعة االصطناعية  ،خوارزمية ال َخالَيا التَغَ ُّ
الكشف عن االقتحام  ،مسح المنفذ.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Overview
Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) are computer systems inspired from Human
Immune System (HIS), which consist of theoretical immunology and immune
functions, these systems recently have been implemented to find solutions for realworld issues such as Denial of Service attack. Several algorithms inspired by the HIS
are applied in both host-based and network-based intrusion detection systems to
defend computers from attacks.
Various algorithms are used in AIS to emulate the behavior of different types
of cells of the immune system. In fact, AIS algorithms are categorized into two
generations. Negative Selection (NS), Clonal Selection (CS) and Immune Network
Theory (INT) are the first-generation algorithms. The applications that rely on
Negative Selection have achieved some success in detecting anomalies attacks on
computer systems, but recently, many limitations have been restricting them.
However, the Danger theory is considered the most important among the secondgeneration algorithms (Bhattacharya, 2014).
According to the Danger theory (Hosseinpour, Abu Bakar, Hardoroudi, &
Kazazi, 2010), the body’s tissues, not the immune cells, are the main director of the
immune system because they release the chemical danger signals. The danger signals,
which are caused by the abnormal cells (self) not the non-self, are the main trigger for
the human immune response. For instance, the body does not react to food particles
because it does not consider them a danger, but it regards them non-self. On the other
hand, the cancer cells are not foreign, but at the same time dangerous to the human
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body. It is clear then that from the Danger theory there is no need to attack every
foreign thing.
Notably, the Dendritic Cell Algorithm is considered the latest research inspired
by the Danger Theory. In the area of anomaly detection in computer and network
systems, DCA has been applied to a range of problems, especially to detect DoS attack
(Greensmith, Aickelin, & Cayzer, 2005). In fact, the most common attacks targeting
hosts are the Denial-of-service (DoS) and the Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
attacks, which start by conducting a scan in order to discover available targets, ports
and services, e.g., a ping and ports scan. The main aim of this scan is to determine the
active IP addresses and ports. Important and confidential information is associated
with the IP addresses and ports, which can be misused by the attacker. On the other
hand, in computer and network systems, it is necessary to check if the scan process is
being done for a malicious purpose. In fact, to detect DoS attacks, some interesting
studies (Greensmith, 2007; Silva, Caminhas, & de Errico, 2017) applied the DCA
algorithm, especially for detecting Ping Scan.
The objectives of this study were to: a) describe Human Immune System,
Artificial Immune System algorithms and depict how to apply AIS algorithms to solve
computer security problems especially Denial of Service attack, b) understand the
Dendritic Cell Algorithm in detail and review the literature concerning the DCA in
order to detect DoS attack. Also, c) investigate DCA to cover SYN scan attack, the
investigation covers three scenarios (Normal, Mix and Attack) in each scenario data
is collected to test the efficiency of DCA implementation in detecting SYN scan
attack. d) Implement the two types of DCA (classical and deterministic) using Java
Language. e) Testing the two hypotheses described in the next section. Finally, f)
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Compare the results of the Mature Context Antigen Value (MCAV) with previous
work and explain the limitation of this work.
This thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 1 presents an introduction of this
work and divided into three sections, the first section describes the objectives of this
work, and the second is the problem statement. The last section is consisting of recent
related work in human immune systems, artificial immune systems, and computer
security. Chapter 2 describes the methodology of this thesis, illustrates the component
of the proposed framework and explain how data is collected using three scenarios
(Attack, Normal and Mix) to examine the implementation of DCA to detect TCP port
scan, it consists of two main sections, namely research design and data collection.
Chapter 3 is about the investigation of TCP port scanning, provide testing scenarios
and extract results to show the efficiency of both type of DCA in detecting TCP port
scan. Also, Chapter 4 shows a discussion of the results by comparing these results with
the related works. Finally, the conclusion of this thesis and future directions for the
algorithm shown in Chapter 5.
1.2 Statement of the Problem
Computer networks have become essential in our modern era, becoming
indispensable in enterprises, corporations, governments, and even in homes. Many
types of computer networks are being used to transmit a huge amount of information
and data between people and institutions in the world, and this information vary in the
importance and degree of confidentiality from public information to very critical and
confidential, hence the importance of these networks appear in the world through the
daily dealings between people in general, and from this importance stems the
important of network security and information security.

4
Threats targeting computer networks vary in their forms, sources, and degree
of severity, ranging from simple, medium to complex threats. Simple threats are those
attacks that anyone can do with primitive knowledge and technique. Another type of
threat is more advanced, in which the attacker has extensive knowledge of the target
security systems and operating systems, and this information can lead to carrying out
more complex attacks.
The most common attacks are occurring inside the computer network systems,
in these attacks the attacker act as a legitimate user with unauthorized access to cause
significant damage to the network. Insider hackers can know a lot of information about
the computer network, operating system, available ports, IP addresses ...etc., and this
information allows them to steal critical data, one of such attack is port scanning.
Recently, many different techniques are used to defend computer networks
from attacks. One of such techniques is to apply Artificial Immune System (AIS)
algorithms to develop efficient Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). The Dendritic Cell
Algorithm which inspired from the AIS theory (Danger Theory) was successfully
applied to a wide range of real-world applications.
The main objective of this thesis is to investigate the two algorithms of the
DCA in order to improve the algorithm's applicability to detect port scanning. Two
research hypotheses were tested:
H0: no significant difference will appear when comparing the MCAVs per
antigen for the two DCA implementations. H1: no difference in MCAV results when
we use two signals per category instead of one.
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1.3 Relevant Literature
1.3.1 Human Immune System
Immunology:
Immunology is the study of the organism that responds to the antigenic
challenge and the way it recognizes self and not-self. The immune system includes a
wonderful collaboration between cells and proteins that work together to create a
defense against infection, such as the invasion of the body by microorganisms
including germs, viruses, parasites, fungus, etc. The immune system consists of
different types of immune cells (mainly B or T cells) that exist in the lymphoid organs
of the body. They are carefully controlled to ensure that appropriate populations of B
and T cells are assigned to different places. Moreover, there is no central organ that
controls the functions of the immune system (Dasgupta, 1999).
The immune system includes two main branches: innate immunity and
adaptive immunity. The cells of the innate system respond immediately to the threat
without the need for previous exposure. It contains a variety of cells including
macrophages and DCs. On the other hand, the adaptive immune system consists of two
classes of cells, T-cells, and B-cells that require training so that cells-of-the-self does
not attack us (Honti, Kurucz, Cinege, Csordás, & Andó, 2015). Figure 1 shows the
cells of the immune system.
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Figure 1: Cells of the immune system (National Pediatric Neuroinflammation
Organization, Inc., 2000)

There are different theories on immunology in relation to the functional and
regulatory behavior between lymphocytes when responding to the attacking antigen
according to (Zuben & de Castro, 1999). These theories include the following:
The Classical Theory:
The Classical theory of the immune system relies on the idea that the immune
system distinguishes between the normal (self) and the malicious (non-self or antigen)
in the body. The identification of antigens results in the creation of specialized
activated cells to destruct these antigens.
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The Clonal Selection Theory:
The clonal selection describes the basic characteristics of the immune response
to antigen stimuli. The basic idea of this theory is that lymphocytes can distinguish
antigens and are called Effector Cells.
The Immune Network Theory:
The theory of clonal selection of the immune system focuses on the group of
separate cells and molecules that are in the rest mode and are only stimulated by an
antigen. The immune network theory offers a different idea of how the immune cells
interact with each other and with the antigen. Moreover, the immune system maintains
a distinct quality network from the interrelated cells to distinguish the antigen. These
cells stimulate and inhibit each other in a specific way that stabilizes the network.
The Danger Theory:
In 1994 (Matzinger, 1994), a new model of the immune system was suggested
by Matzinger, who assumed that the human body does not react to bacteria inside the
food although it is a foreign entity. Also, the theory supposes that there is a conflict
between the Self-Nonself theory and some types of diseases such as autoimmune
diseases, some types of cancer and the transplants.
In fact, the main idea in the Danger Theory is that the immune system responds
to danger not to self and non-self. However, when the danger theory is compared with
the self-nonself theory, they seem similar and differ only with regard to the answer to
this question: what should the immune system respond to?
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In detail, a cell that suffers from danger sends an alarm signal. Then, antigens
are captured by macrophages. After that, this cell travels to the local lymph node and
presents the antigens to lymphocytes.
Basically, the danger signal creates a zone called the danger zone. Hence, the
function of B cells is to produce antibodies to be matched with antigens in the danger
zone in order to get stimulated and replicated. In contrast, those that do not match or
are far away don't get stimulated (Aickelin & Cayzer, 2002). Figure 2 illustrates how
the immune system responds according to the Danger Theory.

Figure 2: The danger theory model (Aickelin & Cayzer, 2002)

The Biological Mechanism of the Dendritic Cell:
Dendritic cells (DCs) are white blood cells that get their name from the surface
that look like the dendrites of neurons. They have two major functions: acting as
macrophages or presenting antigen on the cell surface for the T-cells. So, they act as
couriers between the innate and the adaptive immune systems. Furthermore, DCs are
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found in many places such as tissues, the inner lining of the nose and stomach and are
also found as an immature state in the blood.
Each DC is an immature cell, and its status can be changed according to the
collection of signals received. When DC is immature, it collects debris and antigens.
The DC deals with antigens through receptors on the cellular surface, which sense the
different signals. After the treatment process, DC ultimately depends on the
effectiveness and concentration of the signals. The DCs are found in three statuses
including immature (iDS), semi-mature (smDS) and mature (mDS). When a DC meets
Pathogen-Associated Molecular Pattern (PAMP) or DS (Danger Signal), the DC
converts its state from an immature state to mature state and secretes IL-12. Besides,
it presents antigens to the effector T-cells. On the other hand, signals which are
collected because of apoptosis cause the change from immature state to semi-mature
state and the secretion of IL-10. Accordingly, the smDC cannot activate T- cells, but
it causes antigens presentation. This is vital to the prevention of autoimmunity.
However, inflammation can affect a DC by acting as an amplifier for the power
of all additionally received signals. Figure 3 illustrates the meaning of DC in Biology.

Figure 3: How DC reacts to danger in the human body (Chelly & Elouedi, 2016)
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Inflammation:
The secretion of inflammatory substances like histamine, which is produced
from mast cells and basal white blood cells, makes the blood vessels extend to the
maximum limit. This state increases the permeability of small blood vessels and blood
capillaries to the circulatory system. Therefore, tissues swell in the site of
inflammation allowing soluble and lethal substances to go to the infection site to kill
the bacteria and allowing the neutrophils, monocytes, and macrophages to fight and
kill microbes and foreign objects (Huang, Li, Liang & Finkelman, 2018).

1.3.2 Artificial Immune Systems
The artificial immune system (AIS) is a sophisticated, modern, human-induced
immune system that emerged in the 1990s as a new branch of evolutionary
computation. It is a set of intelligent classification algorithms that use the immune
defense mechanism for adaptive and learning technology. This concept has been
applied to many technical applications over the last decades. The algorithms in the AIS
systems are divided into three categories based on inspired biophysics (populationbased, network-based, and danger theory algorithms).
The immune systems have been applied as a solution to problems in wide areas,
including pattern recognition, error and abnormality detection, data analysis, agentbased systems, research and ethical methods, and protection of information systems.
In addition, it has been used with other methods of building hybrid systems such as
Genetic algorithms and artificial neural networks (Dilek, akir, & Aydin, 2015).
Yang, Li, Hu, Wang, & Zou, (2014) and Silva & Dasgupta (2016) investigated
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the AIS application to IDSs and presented negative and clonal selection-based
methods. They showed how these methods deal with data encoding, and how detectors
are generated. Besides, they discussed the advantages and disadvantages of applying
AIS to IDS.
Specifically, many types of research covered the AIS theories, which have been
developed recently to enhance the performance of IDS. One of these theories is the
“Danger Theory.” One of the pioneering works on the Danger Model is conducted by
Aickelin & Cayzer (2002). In this study, several potential application areas are used to
provide a critical assessment of the concept and its significance for AIS. Also, they
conclude that Danger Model approaches can be used as a data mining tool.

The Dendritic Cell Algorithm:
The Dendritic Cell Algorithm (DCA) is an anomaly detector based on the
correlation between data-streams in the form of antigens and signals as inputs to label
groups output as ‘normal’ or ‘anomalous’. Mainly, the DCA is not considered a
classification algorithm, but it shares properties with certain filtering techniques
(Greensmith, 2007). Figure 4 shows a summary of the Dendritic Cell Algorithm. In
fact, there are two versions of DCA: the deterministic DCA (dDCA) and the classical
DCA (cDCA).
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Figure 4: Summary of the dendritic cell algorithm ( Silva, Palhares, & Caminhas,
2012)
Several immunology terms (Pereira, 2011) are used to explain the algorithm
concerning the computational context. Some important definitions include the
following:
•

The tissue is the computational “area" which needs to be monitored by the
algorithm (example: a storage area).

•

The Antigen is an entity that exists or is related to the tissue being monitored
(for example a process).

•

The Lymph Node is the algorithm's part where DC and its information are used
to decide the danger of the associated antigens.

•

The Signal is a property of the tissue which influences the decision regarding
the safety or danger of tissue at a given time (example: the amount of network
traffic).
As mentioned earlier, DCA is based on the Danger Model proposed in
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Greensmith et al. (2005). The purpose of this research was to understand the Danger
Theory and focus on the dendritic cells concerning changing morphologies, functions,
control of the immune system. The study also showed an example of how a DC
algorithm can be used as a signal processor. Moreover, the DCA uses signal processing
aspects by a generation of output signals through input signals. Practically, there are
many aspects considered by the DCA like the qualitative analysis of the DCA
performance, monitoring, and detection capabilities which are missing in the first
generation of AIS algorithms.
Gu, Greensmith & Aickelin (2009) developed a real-time analysis conducted
by two segmentation approaches: antigen-based segmentation (ABS) and time-based
segmentation (TBS). They segmented the output of DCA into slices. Indeed, the paper
focuses on segmentation with and without DCA. A large real-world dataset based on
a medium scale port-scan was used to test the suggested hypotheses. The results
showed that applying segmentation with DCA produced significant results compared
with the standard DCA without segmentation.
Similarly, Igbe, Ajayi, & Saadawi (2017) proposed an anomaly-based network
intrusion detection system to detect the DoS attack. The system is inspired by the DCA
and consists of three modules: The Data Pre-processing module, Signal Extraction
module, and the DCA module. This approach attempts to solve low accuracy. The
evaluation was performed using NSL-KDD dataset and examined the technique
regarding detection rate and false positive rate.
Anandita, Rosmansyah, Dabar & Cho, (2015) proposed a simple
implementation of the anomaly detection system to detect port scanning. In this paper,
they use one signal per categories.
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A successful technique for the detection of a malicious attack is presented by
Al-Hammadi, Aickelin, & Greensmith (2008). They introduce a new framework to
detect a single bot using the dendritic cell algorithm.
Silva et al., (2017) applied Dendritic Cell Algorithms to ping scan, implement
both the classical and deterministic DCA and compare the DCA to machine learning
methods. They also conclude that the DCA can be used as a monitoring technique.
Al-Dabagh & Ali (2011) applied the DCA to cover the SYN flood attack. The
experimental results show the highest true alarm ratio comparing with previous results.
The Deterministic DCA:
The dDCA (Greensmith & Aickelin, 2008) is considered a simple version of
the DCA as the inputs are minimized to at least two signals (apoptotic and necrotic).
In addition to the changes that were done to the algorithm, a new metric for the
system’s evaluation is proposed namely (Kα), which takes into account the volume of
the output values produced by the DC population. As a result, this requires less
computational resources and fewer parameters tuning, as well as reproducing the same
conditions and the same results for a single test.
In dDCA, there are three inputs: two signals (Danger and Safe) and antigen.
However, the output context consists of two outputs: the CSM and Kα. The new
context is called Kα and contains both mature and semi-mature context variables,
whose signal determines the immune response whether suppression or activation.
Figure 5 depicts the input and the output of the dDCA.
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Figure 5: Framework of dDCA

The Classical DCA:
The classical version of the DCA (cDCA) has three or four input signals and
three output signals. The processing occurs through a weighting matrix in which input
signals (PAMPs, Danger, Safe, and Inflammation) are converted into output variables.
Mainly, the output signals are costimulatory molecules (CSM) responsible for cell
migration after its lifetime in both semi-mature and mature contexts (Greensmith et
al., 2005; Zheng & Fang, 2011 ). Figure 6 shows the Classical DCA.

Figure 6: Framework of cDCA

16
As shown in Figure 6 cDCA, there are five inputs: four signals (PAMPs,
Danger, Safe and Inflammations) and antigen. In that case, this version defines three
output contexts including the Cell Migration Variable (CSM), which strongly
influences the apoptotic signal calculation as well as PAMPs, the Semi-mature context
is affected only by apoptotic signals, and the mature context is strongly influenced by
PAMPs.
Mature Context Antigen Value (MCAV):
Now, for both versions, there is a variable that determines the anomaly degree,
which is called MCAV. Any MCAV value that is close to 0 will classify the antigen
as normal system operation. When MCAV value is closer to 1 then there is a higher
chance to consider this as an anomaly. Table 1 shows some definitions of MCAV to
be reviewed in order to know how it will be calculated during the experiment.
Table 1: Definition of MCAV
Definition
Mean MCAV

The average value during the test that
demonstrates a classification tendency.

Max MCAV

The maximum value that the algorithm
could assign to an antigen, to determine
the degree of normality or abnormality.

Final MCAV

The value that the antigen receives after
its analysis
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Ping Scan Investigation:
The Ping scan experiment (Silva et al., 2017) contains three scenarios: Attack,
Normal and Mixed for both versions of DCA. The antigen types of interest include
two programs: ‘Nmap’ and ‘Scp.’
In the attack scenario, the user runs Nmap to probe several machines on
different networks. On the other hand, in the normal scenario, the user runs the Scp to
send a file to a server. Running two programs in the victim host is the mixed scenario.
In general, each scenario is normalized and tested by two versions of DCA.
The purpose of normalization is to provide a more accurate analysis, thus improving
DCA capabilities in generating better results. Table 2 shows the input of DCA and the
way it is represented in the Ping scan. The analogy between the DC biological model
and the ping scan model in the flowchart is illustrated in Figure 7.
Table 2: Inputs of DCA to detect Ping Scan
Inputs

DCA

Ping Scan

PAMP

‘DU’ packets received

Danger

The volume of outbound traffic

Safe

The rate of change of packets per second

Inflammation

Reflective of machine behavior

Antigen

Each system call
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Figure 7: Analogy flowchart between biological model and ping scan (Silva et al.,
2017)

1.3.3 Computer Security
Denial of Service and Distributed Denial of Service Attack:
Denial of service attack became one of the main threats targeting computer
networks to prevent users from getting the service. It is achieved by flooding the victim
machine or resources with fake requests. Indeed, Denial of service attack is usually
performed for many reasons such as terrorism, fun, and cyber-war, etc. Mainly, there
are two forms of DoS attacks including crash services and flood services. A DoS attack
can be either a single-source attack originating at one host or a multi-source where
multiple hosts attempt to flood the victim with a lot of packets and these are considered
the most serious attacks (Igbe et al., 2017).
The distributed denial of service attack (DDoS) is composed of four
components: first, the victim machine is responsible for receiving the attack. Second,
the attack agent is programs installed on host computers by the attacker. Third, the
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controller aims to coordinate the attack. The last component is the attacker, which is
the brain that plans for the attack (Lau, Rubin, Smith, & Trajkovic, 2000).
Moreover, there are many common types of DoS/DDoS attacks such as ICMP
Flood and SYN Flood attacks that aim to flood a victim node with packets without
waiting for responses. Also, there is a UDP Flood attack, which targets ports in a victim
node and floods it with many UDP packets to get an ICMP error message when any of
such port does not exist.
Another type of attacks is the Ping of Death where the victim node receives
malformed ping packets with a size larger than 65,535 bytes, which causes an overflow
of the memory allocated for each packet. Furthermore, Land Attacks send spoofed
TCP SYN packets with the same victim’s source/destination IP addresses and port
numbers. Therefore, it causes the victim node to send responses to itself continuously
leading to exhaustion in system resources and denial of service to legitimate users
(Peng, Leckie, & Ramamohanarao, 2007; Rivalhost, 2017).
Port Scan:
Port Scanning is a technique used in the network to check specified hosts for
availability and to monitor services in use. However, it can be used for malicious
purposes. Port scanning tools such as ‘Network Mapper’ (Nmap) can reveal
information about hosts responding on a given set of network addresses. This
information may be used by attackers to discover a set of target hosts which are
operating services likely to be vulnerable to attack. It can also be used for an attacker
to learn and understand the topology of a network to launch an attack such as a
distributed denial of service (H Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya, & K Kali, 2010). Figure 8
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shows the TCP/IP packet flow between the host and the attacker when conducting port
scanning.
Victim host with open ports
SYN

Attacker

SYN/ACK

Victim

RST

Victim host with closed ports
SYN

Attacker

Victim

RST

Victim host without IP address
Attacker

SYN

Firewalling

RST

Figure 8: TCP/IP packet flow between host and attacker

There are many types of port scanning (Bhuyan, Bhattacharyya & Kali, 2010),
Figure 9 shows the types of Port scanning:
a) Stealth Scan: it is designed to go undetected by auditing tools. It sends TCP
packets to the destination host with stealth ﬂags. Some of the ﬂags are SYN,
FIN, and NULL.
b) SOCKS Port Probe: A SOCKS port allows sharing of Internet connections
on multiple machines. Attackers scan these ports because a large percentage
of users misconﬁgure SOCKS ports, potentially permitting arbitrarily
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chosen sources and destinations to communicate. A SOCKS port on a
system may allow the attacker to access other Internet hosts while hiding
their true location.
c) Bounce Scan: It takes advantage of a vulnerability of the FTP protocol itself.
Some applications that potentially allow bounce scans are email servers and
HTTP Proxies.
d) TCP Scanning: A TCP connection is never fully established during this type
of scanning. So, it is used by smart attackers. If the attacker can clearly know
that a remote port is accepting connections, the attacker can launch an attack
immediately. It is much more diﬃcult for network defenders to detect this
kind of connection since these attempts are not logged by the server’s
logging system. Some TCP scans are TCP Connect (), Reverse
Identiﬁcation, IP Header Dump scan, SYN, FIN, ACK, XMAS, NULL and
TCP Fragment.
e) UDP Scanning: It attempts to ﬁnd open ports related to the UDP protocol.
However, UDP is a connectionless protocol, and thus, it is not often used by
attackers since it can be easily blocked.
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Port Scan
Types

Stealth Scan

SOCKS Port
Probe

Bounce Scan

TCP Scan

ACK Flag
Scan

SYN Scan

FIN Flag
Scan

SYN | ACK
Scan

UDP Scan

Figure 9: Types of port scans
There are many types of TCP port scanning namely:
1. TCP Connect (), is the default TCP scan type when SYN scan is not an option.
Some network scanning tools such as Nmap asks the operating system to
establish a connection with the target machine and port by issuing the connect
system call. In this type, we finish the handshake process and establish a
connection by sending the final ACK packet.
2. Reverse Identification is a type of TCP port scanning where TCP flags are not
set and no packet received from the victim machine, and it is hard to detect
through Firewall Level.
3. IP Header Dump scan, known as idle or dumb scanning is a vaguely scanning
technique that involves three components first the host, from which the scan
is launched, second the target host, which will be scanned and third the idle
host, which is an Internet-based server. This type of scan considers as stealthy
due to its blind nature.
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4. SYN, is a type of scan that the attacker sends a packet with the SYN flag set.
When the port is open, we receive the ACK packet. else, we receive a Reset
packet.
5. FIN is a type of scan that the attacker sends a packet with the FIN flag set
without first establishing a connection with the target. When the port is open,
we didn’t receive any packet. else, we receive the reset packet.
6. ACK is a type of scan that the attacker sends a packet with the ACK flag set.
When the port is open, we didn’t receive any packet. else, we receive reset
packet
7. XMAS, it’s also called X-MAS tree. It sets a TCP packet with all flags if no
packet is received, the port is considered open and if RST packet is received,
the port is considered closed.
8. NULL It does not set any flags on the TCP packet and send it to the target.
Greensmith & Aickelin (2007) presented an approach that was used to
understand the behavior of the dendritic cell algorithm and to apply it to Port scan
detection based on sending SYN packets over a long duration. However, they
concluded that it is difficult to compare the algorithm with other standard methods.
The Intrusion Detection System (IDS):
Intrusion detection is defined as the process of monitoring the computer system
or network to detect unauthorized use, misuse, and abuse of computer system resources
by internal and external intruders. Indeed, detecting intrusion in the distributed
network from outside and inside the network is a difficult problem.
IDSs can be classified based on the detection approach into anomaly-based IDS
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and signature-based IDS. The anomaly-based detection system can detect unknown
attacks that deviate from normal by monitoring network traffic and user activities for
abnormal behavior. At the same time, Signature IDS tries to match seen network
profiles to an existing attack signature and classifies the matched profile as an attack.
Also, IDSs are classified according to how the data is obtained and used for intrusion
detection, into host-based IDS and network-based IDS. Host-based IDS (HIDS)
monitors specific host machines while a network-based IDS (NIDS) identifies
intrusions on key network points. (Igbe, Darwish, & Saadawi, 2016).
Several states of the art studies have been done to enhance the performance of
the Intrusion Detection Systems, by applying artificial intelligence techniques (Dilek
et al., 2015; Kumar, Kumar & Sachdeva, 2010; Wu & Banzhaf, 2010). The AIS is one
of these techniques which have been applied to prevent cyber-attacks, using immuneinspired approaches (Silva, Palhares, & Caminhas, 2012; Yang, Liu, Li, Liang, & Liu,
2009; Chen, Chang, & Wu, May 2016).
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Chapter 2: Methods
2.1 Research Design
The research framework consists of four main components: the first component
is “Data Preprocessing” which is responsible for extracting features and the
Normalization process. The second component is “Signal extraction” where the
PAMP, Danger, Safe and Inflammation signals are defined. The third component is
“Antigens sampling” where each antigen is represented using a unique number
(Antigen ID). Finally, “DCA” is responsible for classifying inputs to Normal or
Malicious as outputs. Figure 10 shows the proposed framework of DCA.

Data

Data preprocessing and
Normalization

Antigen

Signal

DCA

Normal

Malicious

Figure 10: Our proposed framework of DCA
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2.1.1 Data Pre-processing and Normalization
This step includes two main processes: the first is extracting features from the
network traffic whose values are different due to the presence or absence of abnormal
activity. The second is the Normalization process done to scale the data value between
0 and 100.
2.1.2 Signals
The PAMP-1 is the number of ICMP ‘destination unreachable’ (DU) error
messages received per second (Greensmith, 2007). Scanning IP addresses generate
these error messages in response to probing. Pseudocode 1 shows the normalization
process of PAMP-1.
Pseudocode 1 of the normalization function used to generate PAMP-1.
Input: raw signal values (raw Signal)
Output: normalized signal values (signal)
Pre-Norm-Signal= raw Signal * 5;
Max-Cap=100;
If pre-Norm-Signal > max-Cap then
Signal= max-Cap;
Else
Signal= pre-Norm-Signal;
End
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For example, if the PAMP-1 signal is equal to 40 DU errors per second, then
the Pre-Norm-Signal is equal to 200 by multiplying the signal with 5. The results show
that 200 are greater than the max-Cap so the normalized Signal is equal to 100.
PAMP-2 is the number of TCP reset packets sent and received per second. This
signal is generated from the scanning host if ports are open and are generated by the
remote hosts if ports are closed. The main sign of the scanning activity is that the rest
packets have a high frequency. Pseudocode 2 shows the normalization function used
to generate PAMP-2.
Pseudocode 2 of the normalization function used to generate PAMP-2.
Input: raw system signal values (raw-Signal)
Output: normalized signal values (signal)
Pre-Norm-Signal= raw-Signal;
Max-Cap=100;
If pre-Norm-Signal > max-Cap then signal= max-Cap;
Else
Signal= pre-Norm-Signal;
End

For example, if the PAMP-2 is equal to 20 RSTs per second, following the
previous steps the signal is less than the max-Cap; then, the result of Signal is equal to
20.
DS-1 is derived from the number of network packets sent per second. A
different approach is taken for the normalization of this signal. Pseudocode 3 shows
the normalization function used to generate DS-1.
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For example, if the Danger signal is equal to 750 packets per second. Following
the previous algorithm, the Exponent=7.5-(750/100) =0, then the Factor=2^0=1, and
the Signal= [1/ (1+1)] *100=50.
Pseudocode 3 of the normalization function is used to generate DS-1.
Input: raw system signal values (raw-Signal)
Output: normalized signal values (signal)
Max-Cap = 1500;
If raw-Signal > max-Cap then
Signal = 100;
Else
Exponent = 7.5 - (raw-Signal/100); factor
=2^exponent;
Signal= (1 /1+factor) * 100;
End

DS-2 is derived from the ratio of TCP packets to all other packets processed
by the network card of the scanning host. Pseudocode 4 shows the normalization
function used to generate DS-2.
For example, if the Danger signal 2 is equal to 500, then the ratio = raw-SignalTCP/raw-Signal-All Pkts; 500/2500=0.2. Finally, the signal is equal to the ratio
multiplied by 100. The result will be 20.
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Pseudocode 4 of the normalization function used to generate DS-2.
Input: raw system signal values (raw-Signal-TCP, raw-SignalAll-Pkts)
Output: normalized signal values (signal)
Ratio = raw-Signal-TCP/raw-Signal-All-Pkts;
Signal = ratio * 100;

SS-1 is the change rate of network packet sending per second. Safe signals are
used to reduce the number of false positive antigen types. Pseudocode 5 shows the
normalization function used to generate SS-1.
Pseudocode 5 of the normalization function used to generate SS-1.
Input: raw system rate of change values (raw-Signal)
Output: normalized signal values (signal)
Max-Cap=100; min-Cap = 10;
If raw-Signal < max-Cap then
If raw-Signal < min-Cap then signal = 100;
Else
Signal = (raw-Signal-10)/90; signal = (1- signal) * 100;
End
Else
Signal = 0;
End
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For example, if the signal equals to 200 then the result after normalization will
be safe signal-1 equal to 0.
SS-2 is based on the observation that during SYN scans, the average network
packet size reduces to a size of 40 bytes, with a low standard deviation. This signal
step function is implemented with transformation values presented in Table 3. For
example, if the safe signal 2 is equal to 60, then the normalized signal is equal to 50.
Table 3: Normalization of SS-2
Range

Signal Value

40 - 45

0

46- 50

10

51- 60

50

+61

100

The inflammatory signal is binary and is based on the presence of remote root
logins. If a root log-in is detected through the monitored ssh daemon, this signal is
assigned a value of one.
2.1.3 Antigens
The antigen used for ping scan detection is also suitable for the detection of
SYN scans. Process Identification numbers (PIDs) form the antigens that are generated
each time a system call is invoked.
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2.1.4 Dendritic Cell Algorithm
Classical DCA (cDCA):
Pseudocode 6 of classical dendritic cell algorithm (Silva et al., 2017):
Start DCA (Input Signals: S, Antigens: A)
Initialize Parameters (I, J, M, N, O, P, Q)
Generate DC population, with M cells
While (data evaluation)
Update (A, S)
For each cell m from M
Collect Q antigens from A up to N
For each output p from O
For each input i category j from S
Op=

∑𝑖 ∑𝑗≠3(𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑝 ∗ 𝑆𝑖𝑗 )
∑𝑖 ∑𝑗≠3(𝑊𝑖𝑗𝑝 )

∗ (1 + 𝑆𝑖3 )

If O0 > Threshold Tm of DC (m)
If O1 >O2
Cell context DCm ← smDC
Else
Cell context DCm ← mDC
Migrate DC (m) and generate a new cell
For each antigen a collected from A
MCAV ← mDC(a)/ smDC(a)+mDC(a)
End

As shown in Table 4, weights are used for signal processing, where j represents
the input signal category, i represent an instance of a signal within signal category j

32
and p is the corresponding output signal. Table 5 shows the parameters used in
classical DCA experiment.
Table 4: Weights used in classical DCA
Wijp
p=0
p=1
p=2

j=0
4
0
8

j=1
2
0
4

j=2
6
1
12

Table 5: Default values used in cDCA
Name

Symbol

Value

Number of signals per category

I

2

Categories of the input signal

J

3

Number of cells

M

100

Categories of the output signal

P

3

Antigens

K

5000

Max number of Antigen per cell

R

50

Migration Threshold

tm

100

Example 1.1:
This worked example consists of sample calculations for both the signal
processing and antigen analysis components. For simplification, a DC population size
of one (M = 1) is assumed. To demonstrate the calculations under different input signal
conditions, two iterations with four sets of signals are shown.
The derived output signal values are used to demonstrate how to perform the MCAV
calculation for three different antigen types. In this example, the following parameters
apply, counting from zero.
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In this example, the antigen vector (A) is updated only once at the first iteration.
Each iteration will be taken independently, and calculations are shown for each iterated
value of “l” two times. Two DCs are required in this example, one for each iteration,
termed DC1 and DC2. Each DC is assigned an identical migration threshold value tm,
to a value of 100. The input signal values are artificially constructed so that each DC
only collects one set of signals and antigen, with each DC exposed to a different set of
signals.
Parameters:
In the first step, the parameters of classical DCA must be defined:
•

Two iterations with three sets of signals.

•

I=1, two signals per category.

•

J=3, (PAMP, Danger, safe and Inflammation).

•

K=9, the total number of antigens used in this example with three different
antigens types.

•

M=1, two DCs in the population.

•

N=9, DC stores up to 10 Antigens data items at one time.

•

P=2, three output signals per DC (CSM, semi-mature, mature).

•

Q=variable, the number of antigens sampled per iteration per DC.

•

R=4, each DC can collect a maximum of 5 antigens per iteration.

•

The antigen vector (A) is updated only once at the first iteration.

•

Each iteration will be taken independently and calculations for each iteration
value of “L “two times.

•

Two DCs are required in this example, one for each iteration DC1, DC2.
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•

Each DC is assigned to the migration threshold value tm=100.

Algorithm:
1. DC samples input signals so DC1= {PS1=100, PS2=100, DS1=0, DS2=50,
SS1=100, SS2=0, IS=0}, M=1
2. The antigen vector is updated: A= {Ag1, Ag1, Ag1, Ag2, Ag2, Ag2, Ag2, Ag3,
Ag3, Ag3} (N=9)
3. DC samples antigen, So DC1 a(m)= {Ag1, Ag1, Ag1, Ag2, Ag2}, Chosen
randomly and maximum R=5
4. Equations (1), (2), (3) indicate the outputs of DC1:
(CSM) = ((+)) + (( + )) + (( +))  = 

()

(Semi) = ((+)) + ((+)) + ((+))   =

()

(Mature)  = ((+)) + ((+)) + ((+))   = 

()

5. When O0 >threshold(tm=100) and O2>O1
6. The conclusion that DC1 assigned a cell context value of “1” Its collected antigen
may be Malicious.
7. DC samples antigen, So DC2 a(m) = {Ag2, Ag2, Ag3, Ag3, Ag3}, Chosen
randomly
8. DC samples input signals so DC2= {PS1=10, PS2=50, DS1=100, DS2=0,
SS1=100, SS2=50, IS=0}
9. Equations (4), (5), (6) indicates output signals for DC2:
(CSM) = ((+)) + ((+)) + ((+))  = 

()

(Semi) = ((+)) + ((+)) + ((+))    = 

()
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(Mature) = ((+)) + ((+)) + ((+))   =

()

10. For DC2, t(m)=100, O0 >tm, And O2<O1
11. The conclusion that DC2 assigned a cell context value of “0” Its collected antigen
may be Normal.
12. Analyze the antigens and calculate the MCAV value with Eq. (7)
MCAV=Mature/Antigen count

()

13. Applying threshold to the MCAV to perform anomaly detection, if we consider the
anomaly threshold=0.5 Ag1, Ag2 are classified as malicious because
MCAV1>0.5, MCAV2>0.5, Ag3 classified as Normal because of MCAV3<=0.5.
Deterministic DCA:
Pseudocode 7 of deterministic dendritic cell algorithm (Greensmith & Aickelin, 2008):
start dDCA (Input Signals: S, Antigens: A)
Define Cell Number M
Initialize DC population
While (data evaluation)
Switch input
Case A
Select Cell m up to M from DC
DC collect antigen, update antigen profile
m←m+1
Case S
CSM ← DSi + SSi
K ← DSi-2*SSi
For each cell m de M
DC. Lifetime- = CSM
DC. K+ = K
If DC. Lifetime <= 0
Log DC(m) and its antigens
Renew DC(m)
for each antigen a collected from A
MCAV ← mDC(a)/ smDC(a)+mDC(a)
End
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Example 1.2:
This worked example consists of sample calculations for both the signal
processing and antigen analysis components. For simplification, a DC population size
of one (M = 1) is assumed. To demonstrate the calculations under different input signal
conditions, two iterations with four sets of signals are shown.
The derived output signal values are used to demonstrate how to perform the MCAV
calculation for three different antigen types. In this example, the following parameters
apply, counting from zero.
In this example, the antigen vector (A) is updated only once at the first iteration.
Each iteration is taken independently, and calculations are shown for each iterated
value of “l” two times. Two DCs are required in this example, one for each iteration,
termed DC1 and DC2. Each DC has a limited lifespan equal to 100 csm signal unit.
The input signal values are artificially constructed so that each DC only collects one
set of signals and antigen, with each DC exposed to a different set of signals. The
threshold for the MCAV is set to 0.5.
Algorithm:
1. DC samples input signals so DC1= {DS1=2, DS2=74, SS1=100, SS2=0}, M=1
2. The antigen vector is updated: A= {Ag1, Ag1, Ag1, Ag2, Ag2, Ag2, Ag2, Ag3,
Ag3, Ag3} (N=9)
3. DC samples antigen, So DC1 a(m)= {Ag1, Ag1, Ag1, Ag2, Ag2}, Chosen
randomly and maximum R=5
4. Equations (8), (9) indicate the outputs of DC1:
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(CSM) = DSi + SSi =

()

(K)O1 = DSi −2SSi =−=−

()

5. Lifespan =100-176=-76
DC. Lifespan+=-76
DC. K+=-120
6. If DC. Lifespan<=0 Log DC1 and its antigens
Iteration 1, number of antigens=5
7. K<0 assigned a context value of “0“meaning that its collecting antigen may be
Normal.
8. DC samples antigen, So DC2 a(m) = {Ag2, Ag2, Ag3, Ag3, Ag3}, Chosen
randomly
9. DC samples input signals so DC2 S(m) = {DS1=4, DS2=93, SS1=0, SS2=0, IS=0}
10. Equations (10), (11) indicates output signals for DC2:
(CSM)O0 = DSi + SSi =

()

(K)O1 = DSi −2SSi =−=

()

11. Lifespan =100-97=3
DC. Lifespan+=3
DC. K+=97
12. After iteration number 2 DC. Lifespan value for this DC is -95.0, DC.k value for
this DC is 195.0
13. If DC. Lifespan<=0 Log DC1 and its antigens Iteration 2, number of antigens=5

38
14. Conclusion that “DC assigned a cell context value of “1” Its collected antigen may
be anomalous
15.

To perform anomaly detection a threshold is applied to the MCAV if we

consider the anomaly threshold=0.5 Ag1, Ag2 are classified as normal because
MCAV1<=0.5,

MCAV2<=0.5,

Ag3 classified as anomalous

because of

MCAV3>0.5.
2.1.5 Outputs (O)
In the classic DCA, there are three outputs CSM (O0) which are assessed
against a threshold to limit the duration of the DC signal and antigen sampling, based
on a migration threshold. Semi-Mature (O1) is a terminal state to semi-mature if it is
greater than the resultant mature signal value. Mature (O2) is the terminal state to
mature if it is greater than the resultant semi-mature signal value.
The Deterministic DCA has two outputs: the CSM (O1) as well as cDCA and
the new context called K (O2) which contains both mature and semi-mature context
variables, whose signal determines immune response suppression or activation. If “K”
is negative it will be the normal and safe case (Semi-Mature > Mature) and will be the
malicious case if “K” is positive (Semi-Mature < Mature).
2.2 Data Collection
It is assumed that the DCA is on the victim machine, no internal firewalling is
implemented, and the attacker has obtained the ‘root’ password of the victim host. Kali
Linux which is an Ubuntu-derived Linux distribution designed for digital forensics and
penetration testing is used to collect data for this experiment (Kali, 2013)
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Nmap (Lyon, 1997) is a free and open source for network discovery and
security auditing. Nmap uses IP packets in different ways to determine what hosts,
services, operating systems and type of packet filters/firewalls they are running. Nmap
runs on all major computer operating systems like Linux, Windows, and Mac OS X.
This tool is used for the SYN scan with 254 IP addresses connecting to multiple ports
using these commands:
Nmap -sS -v xxx.xxx.xxx.1-254
Nmap -v -A <IP>-255
Read data from /usr/bin/. /share/nmap
/proc file system (Geek University, 2015) is a special file system in Linux
operating systems that include information about processes and other system
information. Typically, it is mapped to a mount point named /proc at boot time. The
proc file system acts as an interface to internal data structures in the kernel. This /proc
file system is used to derive PAMP-1, Danger-1, Safe-1, and Inflammation signals by
following these commands:
/proc/net/dev
:/proc/sys#/sbin/sysctl -a
:/proc/net#cat TCP
:/proc/net#cat nestat
TCP state (Herman, n.d.) is a tool used to reports certain network interface
statistics. Statistics include bandwidth being used, number of packets, average packet
size, and much more. This tool is used to perform Danger Signal-2 and Safe Signal-2
by using these commands:
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Tcpstat [-? haeFlp] [-B bps] [-b bps] [-f filter expr] [-i interface] [-o output] [-R
seconds] [-r filename] [-s second] [interval]
Output Format:
%T’ the number of TCP packets
%n’ the number of packets
%a’ the average packet size in bytes
TCPdump (Francis, 2016) is a packet analyzer that runs under the command
line. It allows the user to display TCP/IP and other packets being transmitted or
received over a network to which the computer is attached. This is used to derive
PAMP-2 signal which is generated from the scanning host if ports are open and it is
generated by the remote host if ports are closed.
ps/htop (Ņikiforovs, 2016) commands provide information about the currently
running processes, including their process identification numbers (PIDs). The ps
command gives a snapshot of the current processes. If you want a repetitive update of
this status, use top, atop, and htop command. These commands include the following:
•

Top command: Display and update sorted information about processes.

•

Atop command: Advanced System & Process Monitor.

•

htop command: Interactive process viewer.

•

pgrep command: Look up or signal processes based on name and other
attributes.

•

pstree command: Display a tree of processes.

strace (Strace, n.d.) is an analytic, debugging and instructional userspace utility for
Linux. It is used to monitor communications between processes and the Linux kernel,
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which include system calls, signal, and changes of process state. This is used to collect
the Antigens for each scenario to save the process we can use this command:
# top -b -n1 > /tmp/process.log
To know the process id:
$ pgrep <process name>
The result of this command will give us the process ID then we write:
#strace -e trace=open, read -p <process-ID> -s 80 -o <debug.webserver.txt>
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Chapter 3: Results
In our experiment, we used three scenarios: Attack, Normal and Mixed
scenarios. The collected data is 8500 seconds in duration, with ‘normal’ antigen
generated by running Firefox to download any files and send emails to represent
network behavior in the normal situation.
On the other hand, the ‘malicious’ antigen is generated by running Nmap scan
of all ports using 254 IP addresses as a part of a lap network. Running both Firefox
and nmap will perform the Mix scenario. Four active processes in the host computer
SSH, Bash, Nmap, and Firefox form the Antigens shown in Table 6.
Table 6: Number of antigens in each scenario
Mix scenario
Process

Nmap

Firefox

Bash

Number of Antigens

2402

1957

2240

Normal scenario
Process

SSH

Firefox

Bash

Number of Antigens

1330

3154

2797

Attack scenario
Process

Nmap

SSH

Bash

Number of Antigens

3340

991

2106

We assumed that the attacker gains the “root” password and has access to the
victim machine. DCA is running on the victim machine, no internal firewalling is
implemented. In this experiment, we use Kali Linux Debian 8.x 64 bit in a virtual
machine to collect data. Nmap, Wireshark, Tcpstat, TCPdump, SSH are running in the
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victim machine, while PuTTY is running in Hacker machine. The DCA implemented
using JAVA language. Figure 11 shows the topology of the network to launch the
scenarios.

Figure 11: Computer network topology
In the Normal scenario:
1.

Open SSH program using PuTTY program.

2.

The user provides a username and password.

3.

Run Wireshark and Tcpstat to monitor network traffic.

4.

The user runs Firefox and then sends any file via email.

In the Attack scenario:
1.

Open SSH program.

2.

The user provides a username and password.

3.

Run Wireshark and Tcpstat to monitor network traffic.

4.

The user runs Nmap and waits until the scan is done.
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5.

The user exists SSH.

In the Mix scenario:
1.

Open SSH program.

2.

The user provides a username and password.

3.

Run Wireshark and Tcpstat to monitor network traffic.

4.

The user runs Nmap.

5.
6.

The user runs Firefox and then sends any file via email.
The user exists SSH.

The dendritic cell algorithm then classifies the inputs to get the output and then
compare the results of the output with the MCAV threshold to detect the anomaly
process. Figures 12-14, show the percentage of the Antigens in each scenario (Mix,
Attack and Normal). By comparing these results, it is clear that nmap takes the highest
percentage of the system call in the attack scenario 52%. While in a normal scenario,
the percentage of Firefox system call was 43%. On the other hand, in the mixed
scenario, both nmap and Firefox approximately have the same percentage of the
system call. In the experimental phase, only 5000 Antigens are used for the three
different processes.
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Antigen in Mix scenario

Bash
34%

Nmap
36%

Firefox
30%

Figure 12: Antigens in mix scenario

Antigen in Attack scenario

Bash
33%
Nmap
52%
SSH
15%

Figure 13: Antigens in the attack scenario

Antigen in Normal scenario

Bash
39%

SSH
18%

Firefox
43%

Figure 14: Antigens in normal scenario
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The results of MCAV are shown in Table 7 for cDCA and in Table 8 for dDCA.
The mean MCAV for each process is presented, derived across the five runs performed
per scenario. The max MCAV for the malicious process detected by classical DCA in
the attack scenario is 0.85. The max MCAV for the malicious process detected by
classical DCA in the mix scenario is 0.75.
On the other hand, the max MCAV for the normal process detected by classical
DCA in the Mix scenario is 0.32. The max MCAV for the normal process detected by
classical DCA in the normal scenario is 0.29.
Table 7: MCAV result of cDCA

Attack scenario

Mix scenario

Normal scenario

Nmap

Firefox

0.85

-

0.77

-

0.65

-

0.49

0.32

0.63

0.28

0.75

0.22

-

0.29

-

0.052

-

0.035

The max MCAV for the malicious process detected by deterministic DCA in
the attack scenario is 0.82. The max MCAV for the malicious process detected by
deterministic DCA in the mix scenario is 0.79.
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On the other hand, the max MCAV for the normal process detected by
deterministic DCA in the Mix scenario is 0.42. The max MCAV for the normal process
detected by deterministic DCA in the normal scenario is 0.02.
Table 8: MCAV results of dDCA

Attack scenario

Mix scenario

Normal scenario

Nmap

Firefox

0.82

-

0.58

-

0.62

-

0.56

0.42

0.43

0.3

0.79

0.26

-

0

-

0

-

0.02

These results show that in all scenarios, the mean MCAV for the nmap process
is 0.69 in cDCA and 0.63 in dDCA, Nmap has MCAV value that is greater than the
anomaly threshold value, which is 0.45, calculated by the mean value of all MCAV
observed in these experiments.
On the other hand, the results show that in all scenarios, the mean MCAV result
for the Firefox process is 0.1995 in cDCA and 0.167 in dDCA. Both DCAs have
MCAV below the threshold value. The comparison between cDCA and dDCA showed
in Figure 15.
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Upon the test of these scenarios, it was discovered that the Null Hypothesis zero is
rejected because the results of two versions of DCA are approximately the same with
a simple differentiation in the detection of the attack process and normal process.

Comparing cDCA and dDCA
0.9
0.8
0.7
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2
0.1
0

Normal scenario
Nmap cDCA

Mix scenario
Firefox cDCA

Attack scenario

Nmap dDCA

Firefox dDCA

Figure 15: Compare cDCA and dDCA results of MCAV
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Chapter 4: Discussion
By analyzing the results found in the previous chapter, it was found that a
signiﬁcant improvement was achieved by our framework presented for the
classical DCA in detecting an attack process. The value of MCAV is 0.75
compared with the value of 0.61 achieved by Anandita et al. (2015). Also, in
detecting a normal process, the value of MCAV is 0.12 compared with port
scanning investigation (Anandita et al., 2015) with a 0.28 as a value of MCAV. In
cDCA, our MCAV result is greater than what achieved in Port scan detection using
one signal per categories. (Anandita et al., 2015). For the dDCA, this is the first
result achieved with our experiment for detecting port scan using dDCA. The
comparing results between our experiment and the previous one using one signal
per categories are shown in Table 9.
Table 9: Comparing results of DCA with other research
MCAV
Normal
cDCA

MCAV
Malicious
cDCA

MCAV
Normal
dDCA

MCAV
Malicious
dDCA

Port scan detection
0.12
(our experiment)

0.75

0.006

0.67

Port scan detection
(one
signal
per
categories)
0.28
(Anandita et al.,
2015)

0.61

-

-

From the discussion, it is concluded that the Null Hypothesis one: there is no
difference in MCAV results when we use two signals per category instead of one is
rejected.
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For the evaluation of DCA performance for both classical and deterministic,
this test has been conducted using the result of mix scenario. Mix scenario is the most
suitable scenario for calculating the percentage of false positive and negative because
in this scenario we present malicious process and normal process at the same time. To
understand the calculation of true/false positive and negative Table 10 illustrate a
simple example of how we will calculate these values:
Table 10: Calculation of antigens detection
Antigen (process ID)

Detected

Undetected

Malicious

1630

539

Normal

67

307

So:
P (D/M) =True positives =1630/2543
P (UD/M) =False negative = 539/2543
P (UD/N) = True Negative = 307/2543
P (D/N) = False positive = 67/2543
The calculation of the false negative occurs until the MCAV reach the
threshold; any detection differs from Nmap consider as false positive. The results are
presented in Table 11 and Table 12, for cDCA, and in Table 13 and Table 14, for
dDCA, where: TP refers to true positive, FP refers to false positive, TN refers to true
negative and FN refer to the false negative.
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Table 11: Tests conducted in mix scenario for cDCA
Number of
presentations

Number mature
presentation

MCAV

Nmap

4217

2675

0.634337207

Firefox

391

110

0.281329923

Bash

383

119

0.310704961

Nmap

2400

1176

0.49

Bash

600

193

0.3216667

Firefox

1100

350

0.3181818

Nmap

2169

1630

0.7514984

Firefox

203

45

0.2216749

Bash

171

22

0.128655

Antigen type
Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Table 12: Performance test for cDCA in mix scenario
Mix 1
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

53.59

4.59

10.92

30.90

Mix 2
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

28.68

13.24

28.22

29.86

Mix 3
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

64.09

2.64

12.08

21.19
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Table 13: Tests conducted in mix scenario for dDCA
Number of
presentations

Number mature
presentation

MCAV

Nmap

2169

1220

0.5624712

Firefox

203

86

0.4236453

Bash

171

50

0.2923977

Nmap

2400

1040

0.4333333

Bash

600

120

0.2

Firefox

1100

330

0.3

Nmap

4217

3340

0.79203225

Firefox

391

103

0.26342711

Bash

383

150

0.391644909

Antigen type
Test 1

Test 2

Test 3

Table 14: Performance test for dDCA
Mix 1
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

48.02

5.3

9.36

37.32

Mix 2
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

25.3

10.9

30.5

33.2

Mix 3
Threshold

TP

FP

TN

FN

45%

66.92

5.06

10.4

17.6
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Based on the results, some metrics were defined, called sensitivity or recall
(Se), specificity (Sp) and precision (Pr). Sensitivity and specificity may determine best
values for the anomaly threshold and precision may determine how the detection is
satisfaction. Shown in Table 15.
Se = TP/ TP + FN

(12)

Sp = TN / TN + FP

(13)

Pr = TP / TP + FP

(14)

Table 15: Some performance metrics applied to cDCA and dDCA
cDCA

Se

Sp

Pr

Mix 1

0.634276

0.704062

0.921107

Mix 2

0.489921

0.680656

0.68416

Mix 3

0.751524

0.820652

0.960438

dDCA

Se

Sp

Pr

Mix 1

0.56269

0.638472

0.9006

Mix 2

0.432479

0.736715

0.698895

Mix 3

0.791765

0.672704

0.929703

Furthermore, the dendritic cell algorithm was used in many types of research
as anomaly detection especially to problems in network intrusion detection system.
The algorithm shows good results in detecting malicious process, three types of attack
are used: Ping scan, Bot, and Flood attack. Table 16 shows these results.
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We observed that the best results of MCAV were obtained by Bot detection
(Al-Hammadi et al., 2008) where the value of MCAV is 0.82, 0.113 to detect both
malicious and normal process.
Moreover, two investigations to detect ping scan using classical DCA were
done by Silva et al., (2017) and Greensmith (2007). The results in Silva et al., (2017)
were 0.81 and 0.18 in detecting an attack and normal process, and the results in
Greensmith (2007) were 0.79 and 0.34 in detecting the attack and normal process.
Also, for the flooding attack examined by Al-Dabagh & Ali (2011), the result showed
that for the normal scenario MCAV was equal to 0.29 and for the malicious MCAV
was equal to 0.8.
On the other hand, for the deterministic cell algorithm, the MCAV results that
the current experiment achieved is less than the ping investigation achieved before
which was 0.78 to detect malicious process (Silva et al., 2017). Figures 16 and 17 show
the chart of these results.
Table 16: MCAV result of DCA application detecting malicious process
MCAV
Normal
cDCA

MCAV
Malicious
cDCA

MCAV
Normal
dDCA

MCAV
Malicious
dDCA

Ping scan detection
0.18
(Silva et al., 2017)

0.81

0.12

0.78

Bot detection (Al0.113
Hammadi et al., 2008)

0.82

-

-

Ping scan detection
(one
signal
per
0.34
categories)
(Greensmith, 2007)

0.79

-

-

Flooding Attack (Al0.29
Dabagh & Ali, 2011)

0.80

-

-
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cDCA
MCAV Normal
0.75
0.61

MCAV Malicious

0.81

0.79

0.82

0.8

0.34
0.12
Port scan
detection

0.29

0.18

0.28

0.113

Port scan
detection (one
signal per
categories)

Ping scan
detection

Bot detection

Ping scan
detection (one
signal per
categories)

Figure 16: cDCA comparing chart

dDCA
MCAV Normal

MCAV Malicious

0.78
0.67

0.12

0.006
Port scan detection

Ping scan detection

Figure 17: dDCA comparing chart

Flooding
Attack
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
This thesis contributes to enhancing the application of the Dendritic Cell
Algorithms to the Port scanning detection problems. Specifically, it introduces novel
thinking and techniques to the fields of AIS and IDS. A secondary contribution is the
selection of DCA itself while the former AIS approaches rely on simplified models.
Furthermore, the algorithm has several components which include the use of multiple
signal models and signal categorization.
5.1 Research Implications
Regarding comparison, the differences between cDCA and dDCA are
described in terms of robustness. Two research hypotheses were tested and rejected:
H0: no significant difference will appear when comparing the MCAVs per antigen for
the two DCA implementations. H1: there is no difference in MCAV results when we
use two signals per category instead of one.
5.2 Limitation and Future Work
There are a few weaknesses in this study. The first is the lack of a formal
definition of this algorithm, which results in doubts in understanding its algorithmic
properties. This could result in incorrect implementations and applications. In addition,
the analysis phase of the algorithm is often performed once at the end. This makes it
difficult to handle the scenarios online. Also, the pre-processing phase of the algorithm
is performed manually by users based on their expert knowledge of a given problem
domain. This causes the algorithm to be application dependent, and thus such a preprocessing phase should be automated and be adaptable to the characteristics of the
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underlying data. Finally, it is hard to set a standard MCAV threshold for all types of
attack because of the false alarm rate.
Many different tests and experiments have been remained to work in the future
due to lack of time. It will be a good idea to test, compare and implement all types of
port scan that mentioned earlier in Chapter 1, showing how DCA can detect these
attacks and comparing results using two types of DCA implementation.
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